Learning from elsewhere: from cross-cultural explanations to transnational prescriptions in criminal justice. An introduction by Colson, Renaud & Field, Stewart
Learning from Elsewhere: from cross-cultural explanations to 
transnational prescription in criminal justice? 
 
Dr Renaud Colson (University of Nantes) and Professor Stewart 
Field (University of Cardiff) 
 
Acknowledgements: This Special Supplement emerged from a workshop jointly 
organised by the Centre for Crime, Law and Justice and the Centre of Law and Society at 
Cardiff Law School in May 2017. The project benefited from the financial support of the 
Centre of Law and Society, the Cardiff University International Visiting Fellow scheme 
and the Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht in 
Hamburg. 
 
1. Comparing criminal justice systems in a transnational era 
 
We are living at a time in which increasingly concerns about crime and 
security are shared across national borders and our responses are 
becoming transnational: this is evident in intensifying international efforts 
at crime-control co-operation and the dissemination of particular 
approaches to crime prevention, criminal justice and the rule of law. 
These developments are being implemented partly through international 
law (especially international criminal law and international human rights 
law) and partly through wider and more diverse forms of supranational 
influence and intergovernmental cooperation. There is now a substantial 
grey literature emerging from international institutions such as the United 
Nations, the European Union and the Council of Europe producing 
comparative data and research and seeking to promote particular views of 
good practice in relation to a variety of issues around crime, security and 
justice.1 
 
In this context, it is hardly surprising that the comparative study of 
criminal justice practice and policy and its transfer across national 
boundaries is beginning to emerge as a new field of research both in 
criminology and criminal justice.2 One can distinguish two linked research 
questions within this field. The first is the more descriptive or analytical. 
How are concepts of good or best practice in security and criminal justice 
being constructed and circulated transnationally? How do transfers take 
place, through what channels and with what effects (good and bad)? Here 
the task is to chart what is actually happening in the development of 
transnational prescription in criminal justice practice and policy. The 
second research question is more directly normative with clear 
 
1 The UN Office on Drugs and Crime, the European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights or the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug 
Addiction are obvious examples. 
2 See esp. T Newburn, R Sparks (eds.), Criminal Justice and Political Cultures: 
National and International Dimensions of Crime Control (2004), and D Melossi, M 
Sozzo, R Sparks, (eds.) Travels of the Criminal Question: Cultural 
Embeddedness and Diffusion (2011). 
prescriptive implications. To what extent is it desirable to seek to identify 
transnational good or best practice? What are the difficulties and 
challenges in doing so validly? If transfers of policy and practice can 
sometimes be desirable, how should they be carried out in order to 
promote the exchange of good practice (as opposed to bad)?  
 
What both descriptive and prescriptive research questions have in 
common is that they require an engagement with the underlying 
challenge of cross-cultural diversity in social and legal norms. If the 
definition and operation of concepts and practices in security and justice 
varies according to cultural contexts, then this raises questions both 
about the feasibility of effective transfer and its desirability. In turn, this 
then raises questions about the role of comparative researchers and 
cross-cultural research in informing good learning practices and criticizing 
bad ones. We may anticipate that, in so far as it is governments that are 
shaping transfers, they are likely to be driven by the immediacy of their 
own instrumental and political goals. Established in particular legal 
jurisdictions and shaped by the cultures of particular nations, they may 
struggle to come to terms with the significance of cross-cultural diversity. 
What part can or should cross-cultural research play in defining good 
transnational practice and assessing the consequences, both good and 
bad, of transfer? What kinds of comparative research might be 
appropriate to the task?  
 
There are several distinct strands to the published academic research that 
relates to these questions. First there is a substantial body of conceptually 
sophisticated and methodologically reflective research in politics and 
international relations on policy transfer studies. It even has its own 
acronym (PTS). But as yet, very little of this has been applied in the 
criminal justice and criminological field.3  Secondly there is a burgeoning 
literature in comparative law which uses the concepts of legal transplant 
and legal adaptation to examine the transfer of legal rules and practices. 
But again, there has been only a limited focus on criminal justice.4 There 
is a more substantial literature on broader questions of comparative 
criminal justice;  but policy transfer is often not a direct focus and such 
work is often seen as in need of greater conceptual and methodological 
 
3 See for a notable exception, T Jones and T Newburn, Policy Transfer and 
Criminal Justice: Exploring US Influence over British Crime Control Policy (2007). 
See Jones and Newburn, this volume for the authors’ reflections on the 
significance of policy transfer studies to comparative criminal justice. 
4 For a sample of studies, see D Nelken and J Feest (eds), Adapting legal 
cultures (2001). For a notable exception to the neglect of criminal justice, see M 
Langer (2004) 'From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalisation 
of Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Process’' 45 
Harvard International Law Journal 1 
reflection.5 In recent years we have seen the rise of a diverse academic 
and policy literature stretching across criminology, politics and 
international relations which treats a very wide range of transnational 
issues of public safety and social order as questions of ‘security.’ This 
includes a concern to define ‘legitimate security’ and to address normative 
questions about the ‘good’ in security.6 Yet the approach has traditionally 
been based more on notions of security as a general human need with a 
dominant universal logic rather than something differently experienced, 
felt and managed by different groups.7 The examination of the influence 
of cultural differences on the lived experience of security is as yet 
underdeveloped.8 Finally, there are substantial specialist legal literatures 
on international and European criminal law and the development of 
European criminal justice. But the general drive of much of the research 
is towards developing coherent general normative principles to organise 
these different fields rather than examining their effects and implications 
for diverse legal cultures.9  
 
2. Functionalism and its critiques  
 
In order to develop conceptual reflection on the terms and conditions of 
sound comparison and its implications for policy transfer in the specific 
contexts of criminology and criminal justice, an obvious starting point is 
mainstream comparative law. In the last thirty years, the rise of 
 
5 David Nelken’s work involves a continuing concern that those working in 
comparative criminal justice should be more reflexive in the development and 
use of concepts. See among others:  Contrasting Criminal Justice : Getting From 
Here to There (2000) and Comparative Criminal Justice : Making Sense of 
Difference (2010). 
6 A Crawford and S Hutchinson (2016) ‘The Future(s) of Security Studies’ 56(6) 
BJ Crim 1049, 1053. For a particular attempt to develop the concept of 
legitimate security see S Virta and M Branders (2016) ‘Legitimate Security? 
Understanding the Contingencies of Security and Deliberation’ 56(6) BJ Crim 
1146 
7 A Crawford and S Hutchinson (2016) ‘The Future(s) of Security Studies’ 
op.cit.,1053.  
8 But see for an agenda: A Crawford and S Hutchinson (2016) ‘Mapping the 
Contours of ‘Everyday Security: Time, Space and Emotion’ 56(6) BJ Crim 1184. 
There are important exceptions to this generalisation that offer pointers for 
future development. On urban security in Europe, see A Edwards and G Hughes 
(2013) ‘Comparative European Criminology and the Question of Urban 
Security’, 10(3) European Journal of Criminology 257 and the special issue that 
this introduces. On policing, see the Special Issue of European Journal of Policing 
Studies 2(1) Policing European Metropolises edited by A Edwards, P Ponsaers, A 
Recasens, I Brunet, A Verhage (2014), and E Devroe, A Edwards and P Ponsaers 
(eds), Policing European Metropolises: The Politics of Security in City-Regions 
(2017). 
9 See nonetheless R. Colson and S. Field (eds), EU Criminal Justice and the 
Challenges of Diversity: Legal Cultures in the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice (2016)   
globalization and the harmonization of legal fields as diverse as 
commercial law, company law, constitutional law or human rights law 
have stimulated academic research on the methods of legal comparison. 
The dominant approach relies on the idea that only laws which fulfil the 
same function can be compared. According to the so-called functional 
method, the goal of comparison is to understand how different societies 
solve similar problems in diverse ways. This in turn opens the door to 
legal progress because the contrast between various solutions helps to 
identify best practices and to circulate them.  
 
At first sight, the identification of functional equivalents in different legal 
systems seems to provide an appropriate tool to overcome the descriptive 
and normative challenges facing comparatists in the field of criminal 
justice. Not only does it provide a framework to identify what is worth 
comparing (different legal rules and normative practices deployed to solve 
similar criminal problems and analogous security issues), but it also 
allows us to assess these norms and possibly promote or criticise their 
diffusion depending on how they fulfil their goal. A good example is 
provided by the way the development of negotiated justice and plea-
bargaining in different states is described as a response to a common 
problem, namely an increasing burden on criminal procedures due to an 
increasing crime rate.10 In the light of such a diagnosis, it then becomes 
possible to compare the various national manifestations of plea-
bargaining in order to determine how each of them meet this goal, what 
overall impact it has on the functioning of the criminal justice system, and 
evaluate whether it should be extended further or applied in other 
contexts.11 
 
Although dominant in comparative scholarship, the functional approach 
has been under fierce attack. The critique is manifold and bears both on 
the method itself (criticised as relying on a simplistic and instrumental 
view of legal technique) and its goals (said to be practice-oriented, 
lacking neutrality and blind to cultural diversity). Some critiques claim 
that the mainstream approach precludes a sophisticated understanding of 
the relationship between norms and their functions and is heavily tilted 
towards hegemonic harmonization, not to say unification, of laws. 
Ultimately, its most radical opponents reject the quest for similarities at 
the core of the functionalist approach and claim that the legal 
comparisons should essentially focus on differences instead of pseudo-
convergences.12  
 
 
10 M. Langer, “ From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations”, op. cit., 37. 
11 M. Wade, “Why some old dogs must learn new tricks: Recognising the new in 
EU criminal justice?” in Colson and Field (2016), op.cit. n.000 
12 P. Legrand, ‘The Same and the Different’, in Comparative Legal Studies: 
Traditions and Transitions, eds. P. Legrand & R. Munday (2003), 240. 
This critique seems all the more powerful in the field of criminal justice, a 
domain where distinctive legal characteristics are deeply entrenched. 
Rooted in history and tradition, criminal law - especially in its procedural 
dimension – should not be viewed as a mere set of technical 
arrangements. It emerges within a historical context and it articulates 
local political and cultural constructs which seem to determine its 
development as much as its explicit function. As a result, the quest for 
functional equivalence to explain the circulation of criminal models may 
prove problematic as it overlooks other fundamental determinants in the 
transfer of norms and institutions. Thus, in understanding a practice like 
negotiated justice, we may need to think more about the effects of legal 
and political cultures to explain the ways in which the apparent  
homogenization of legal practices may conceal continued differences or 
even the development of unpredictable consequences.13 This in turn may 
lead us to be very cautious with, or even to abstain from, any normative 
statement on the desirability of legal transfer. 
 
Should comparatists resign themselves to oversimplification in order to 
shape the increasing normative exchanges which characterize criminal 
justice systems? Or should they sacrifice policy prescription on the altar of 
cultural complexity? At first sight, the fierceness of the ongoing 
methodological dispute and the depth of the epistemological discrepancy 
between the functionalist and the hermeneutic perspectives seem to rule 
out any reconciliation of the two points of view. Yet compromise should 
not be seen as precluded. Although functional and interpretive 
approaches are based on very different epistemological starting points, 
both stress the need for a contextual analysis of law.  
 
3. Comparison as Translation 
 
Translation studies can provide a useful guide to the researcher involved 
in the comparison and the circulation of norms and practices between 
criminal justice systems. Language and law are analogous in many ways. 
Both are systems of rules (linguistic or legal) which evolve in particular 
social, economic and political contexts. Both are the result of historical 
processes shaped by interaction with other linguistic and legal systems, 
and these interactions often reflect hegemonic power relationships. 
Moreover, comparative law and translation studies have much in 
common.14 Comparative lawyers are often obviously confronted with the 
 
13 E Grande, Legal Transplants and the Inoculation Effect: How American 
Criminal Procedure Has Affected Continental Europe (2016) American Journal of 
Comparative Law 64, M Langer, op.cit. n000 
14 See, among others, V. Grosswald Curran, “Comparative Law and Language”, 
in Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, eds. M. Reimann & R. Zimmerman, 
(2006), chap. 20; C. Laske, “Translators and Legal Comparatists as Objective 
issue of translation when working on foreign laws. But beyond this visible 
connection, which simply flows from different legal systems being in 
different languages, there are other similarities between the two 
disciplines. Indeed, both provide methods to mediate meanings and 
identify correspondence between distinct semiotic universes, and both 
engage in debates on the value of these methods and their results. 
 
The first lesson that researchers involved in the comparison of criminal 
laws can learn from translation studies is that mediating the exact same 
information from one language into another is impossible. While the 
translator should strive to say ’almost the same thing’,15 it can never 
achieve an ‘ultimate’ translation in the target language without a loss. 
Because languages do not signify identically, all translation necessarily 
implies some sort of distortion. In an influential essay,16 Walter Benjamin 
illustrated this phenomenon using a simple example: while the word 
German Brot and the French word pain refer to essentially the same 
bread, these two words are not interchangeable as they mean something 
different to a German, who will probably have in mind Vollkornbrot, and 
to Frenchman, who will most likely be thinking of a baguette. Similarly, 
the comparatist lawyer willing to describe foreign rules and legal concepts 
can hardly claim to fully render their meaning to its audience.17 American 
plea bargaining, German Absprachen, French comparution immediate sur 
reconnaissance préalable de culpabilité, and Italian pattegiamento may 
well all be referred to as guilty pleas, but they are not interchangeable. 
On the contrary, it could be argued that each of these concepts excludes 
the others. They have different meanings. Each of them refers to a 
distinct set of rules and practices, all deeply culturally bound and 
reflecting particular legal mentalities which are incommensurable. 
 
The second lesson that translations studies can provide to comparatist is 
that since there is no “true” translation, the translator is bound to betray 
somehow the original text and the host language,18 and he should 
accordingly choose an interpretative strategy. Does he want to convey 
the strangeness of the original text and communicate its cultural and 
linguistic particularities to a foreign readership at the risk of being cryptic 
and elusive? Or does he aim at a more transparent discourse in the host 
language at the risk of assimilation of the cultural other? Depending on its 
choice, the translator will stick to the word or to the spirit of the original 
 
Mediators between Cultures?”, in Objectivity in Law and Legal Reasoning, eds. J. 
Husa & M. van Hoecke (2013) 213. 
15 U. Ecco, Dire quasi la stessa cosa. Esperienze di traduzione, 2003. 
16 W. Benjamin, 'Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers' (1923), at: 
https://www.textlog.de/benjamin-aufgabe-uebersetzers.html 
17 S. Glanert, “Translation Matters”, in Comparative Law: Engaging Translation, 
ed. S. Glanert (2014) 1. 
18 F. Ost, “Law as Translation”, in The Method and Culture of Comparative Law: 
Essays in Honour of Mark Van Hoecke, eds. M. Adams & D. Heirbaut (2014) 69. 
text, to the letter or to the genius of the host language. This decision is 
sometimes framed in ethical terms, as a choice between “authenticity” 
and “ethnocentrism”.19 Yet, Julian Barnes has rightly pointed out that the 
translation that works best may sometimes be the one least faithful to the 
original.20 This “politics of translation” in relation to the work of 
translators mirrors the “politics of comparison” which is also at play, 
although usually implicitly, in the work of legal comparatists.21 Indeed, 
similar issues arise in the comparative description and appreciation of 
foreign criminal justice systems.  
 
In order to describe foreign rules and foreign institutions, the comparatist 
can try to do justice to their originality, to emphasize their otherness to 
the point of incomprehension, or he can choose to emphasize sameness 
over difference in order to make the foreign model understandable and 
possibly transferable. The choice between these two approaches has 
political consequences. The study of law, including comparative law, is not 
only a contemplative activity: part of its value derives from its ability to 
transform legal representations and legal practices.22 These political 
stakes are especially high as comparative arguments are frequently used 
in the framing of national and transnational criminal policies. When 
involved in such enterprise, the comparatist cannot always take refuge in 
the ethereal debate on cultural appropriation and the authenticity of the 
comparative process. He necessarily has to take a stance, if only because 
the knowledge he produces is likely to have a governance effect, because 
cross-cultural comparisons play a crucial role in accelerating the 
circulation of policy ideas and legal models. 
 
Like the translator, the comparatist should reflect on the purpose of his 
research to determine what comparative strategy to adopt. This is all the 
more necessary if he is engaged in a process of law reform, whether it be 
new procedural guarantees for individuals, increased crime control 
efficacy or the administrative modernisation of criminal justice. In that 
case, he should remember that any legal transfer from one setting to 
another is fraught with uncertainty.23 All jurisdictions have an established 
framework for thinking and doing criminal justice (a criminal justice 
language) that imposes particular constraints but also offers specific 
opportunities. As a result, the most faithful transfer from one jurisdiction 
 
19 F. Schleiermacher, “On the Different Methods of Translating” (1813), in 
Glanert, op. cit., 9. 
20 ‘Translating Madame Bovary’ in J Barnes Through the Window (2012). 
21 D. Kennedy, ‘The Methods and the Politics’, in Legrand & Munday, op. cit., 
345. See also ‘New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and 
International Governance’ (1997) Utah Law Review, 545. 
22 H. Muir-Watt, ‘La fonction subversive du droit comparé’ (2000) Revue 
internationale de droit comparé 52, 503. 
23 D. Nelken, ‘Comparatists and Transferability’, in Legrand & Munday, op. cit., n 
…, 437. 
to the other may not be the most effective. Yet there may be occasions 
where showing one’s fidelity to the original model may be a matter of 
important political symbolism and effectiveness in practice on the ground 
a lesser concern.24  
 
4. Article summaries 
 
With this volume, we hope to place reflection on comparative 
methodology at the centre of scholarly debate on transnational 
harmonisation of criminal law. This Special Issue seeks to do this by 
asking notable cross-cultural researchers to reflect on their own 
experiences, positive and negative, in attempting in particular studies to 
define good transnational practice or to negotiate cross-cultural 
difference. In so doing, it seeks to develop insights into both of the 
research challenges with which we started: the descriptive analysis of 
mechanisms of international transfer of policy and practice and the 
prescriptive evaluation of the characteristics of good and bad transfers. All 
contributors engage with comparative practices and methodologies in the 
specific contexts of transnational criminal policy, and all discuss studies or 
initiatives that represent good practice as well as counter examples where 
good practice has been defined invalidly and/or unhelpfully.   
 
The first article of the special issue provides a general perspective “on 
transnational policy flows in security and justice”. It offers an overview of 
cross-national comparative research in relation to crime control and penal 
policy. Trevor Jones and Tim Newburn’s state-of-the-art account of policy 
transfer studies shows that there is now a sufficient body of work on the 
subject to make some general observations on the increasing circulation 
of criminal policy models and criminological ideas around the globe. The 
article addresses empirical questions relating to how far and in what ways 
crime, security and justice policies are actually transferred across national 
boundaries, what happens to them in the process, and what factors might 
explain such phenomena. These include ‘rational’ attempts at policy 
learning from other jurisdictions, but also ‘coercion’ orchestrated by 
powerful ‘hegemon’ states and ‘mimicry’ whereby norms and policies are 
emulated for symbolic reasons rather than likely effectiveness. Jones and 
Newburn then proceed to reflect on the desirability of such cross-national 
exchange. Observing that much research in relation to policy transfer in 
crime control adopts a pessimistic position in the light of the ‘punitive 
turn’ that has emerged in many western countries, the authors discuss 
the normative principles that might be used to explore the possibilities for 
progressive policy transfer. 
 
The identification of such progressive policy in order to promote their 
diffusion across borders is central to the construction of global social 
 
24 See both Nelken and Jones and Newburn for examples in this Special 
Supplement 
indicators. David Nelken’s article “on the significance of context in and for 
transnational criminal justice indicators” notes the growing interest of 
criminologists and comparative law scholars in such data. Drawing upon 
the example of the recent global targets set by the United Nations in the 
field of criminal justice, Nelken questions the way ideas that count as 
good practice are selected and how they are used to frame transnational 
comparisons. Global indicators which are used to evaluate local conditions 
in terms of overarching standards are neither purely descriptive nor 
politically neutral: they have knowledge and governance ‘effects”. Those 
engaged in exercises of transnational ranking and target setting may 
often be tempted to disregard contexts. But applying similar (criminal) 
standards to dissimilar places may have adverse consequences when 
pursuing projects of social improvement, such as the fight against 
corruption or gender violence. While Nelken does not rule out the 
possibility that, with proper design, global indicators might have the 
potential to make effective contributions, he warns against the dangers of 
simplistic comparison. Calling for more empirical studies on how global 
indicators accomplish commensuration between diverse settings, Nelken’s 
article highlights the methodological difficulties attached to governance by 
numbers in transnational criminal policy, especially in the diffusion of best 
practices and ideal standards. 
 
Field’s article, which focuses on the “comparative analysis of youth justice 
cultures”, examines precisely some of the methodological challenges in 
using comparative research to inform policy transfer. It is rare to attempt 
the transposition of whole criminal justice systems from one jurisdiction 
to another: it is more common to seek to transfer particular elements of a 
system such as a penal measure or a legal role. But how can we predict 
the impact of a transferred element when it is placed within a different 
cultural context? Where criminal justice cultures are very different, their 
elements may not be directly comparable, or their significance may be 
conditioned by the system of which they are part. Drawing on a bilateral 
comparative study of youth justice in Italy and England and Wales 
conducted with Nelken, Field explains the difficulty of comparing 
particular pre-trial interventions in two jurisdictions where the relationship 
of pre-trial and trial phases and between civil and criminal intervention is 
very different. Arguing for the need to understand criminal justice 
practices in the light of the legal and political cultures within which they 
are imbedded, Field argues that learning from very different ‘elsewheres’ 
should be seen in terms of broadening the criminal justice imagination 
rather than furnishing particular solutions with predictable consequences.  
 
Renaud Colson’s paper on transnational drug policy demonstrates that 
comparative law has the potential to expand the agenda of “thinkable” 
possibilities. The article explores the insights that may be gained from the 
vast amount of comparative data produced to monitor the implementation 
of the international drug control regime. At a time of growing doubt about 
the benefit of criminalisation of drug use, it provides a case study on the 
ways that epistemic communities may rely on comparative research to 
identify best practices and promote them as normative alternatives in the 
face of a long entrenched legal dogma. In order to explore these issues, 
the article looks at the UN drug control system from the perspective of 
comparative law. It shows how the concept of legal transplant provides a 
useful tool to understand the limits of transnational criminal law designed 
on a global scale to tackle the “drug problem”. The article also identifies 
the various types of legal comparison that might contribute to addressing 
this failed transplant. It argues that while comparative analysis can 
certainly make substantial contributions to legal and policy knowledge, its 
ability to provide universal solutions applicable on a transnational basis 
should not be overrated. Even when grounded in sophisticated design, 
legal comparisons are always open to interpretation and can sometimes 
prove erroneous. In this respect, comparison of laws and regulatory 
measures on drugs is no substitute for rigorous policy evaluation. 
 
The Special Issue concludes with two particular case-studies which 
consider the potential impact of comparative research on the building of 
transnational norms. In the first, Jackie Hodgson reflects on her recent 
experiences as a member of cross-cultural research teams. The teams 
were funded by the European Commission to do comparative empirical 
research aimed at informing the development of EU Directives on 
suspects’ rights to legal advice in police custody. She notes that the legal 
form of transnational norms can make a significant difference to their 
effectiveness: the European Union’s capacity for proactively legislating the 
particulars of suspects’ rights has a potential to influence practice that 
goes beyond the more abstract and reactive interventions of the 
European Court of Human Rights. But in understanding the potential 
impact of Directives in different jurisdictions, what is essential is empirical 
research that goes beyond the comparison of formal legal texts to 
examine the variable ways that these may be translated into the 
everyday practices of law and the experiences of suspects in different 
jurisdictions. Comparative empirical research enables us to understand 
the different ways in which the professional organisation of criminal 
defence or the provision of legal aid may shape the real meaning of a 
right to custodial legal advice. It enables us to appreciate the impact of 
variable institutionalized relations between police, prosecutor, defence 
lawyer and judge. It provides us with a basis not just for advice on 
constructing legal norms but also on the training that may shape 
professional cultures. Critical to this is the kind of insight that can be 
generated by cross-cultural research teams.  
 
The final article by John Jackson charts the transnational development of 
legal norms relating to security-cleared counsel (special advocates): these 
are lawyers acting in trials where evidential material is regarded as so 
sensitive to the interests of the state that their access to that material is 
conditional on not disclosing it to their ‘client’. Like Hodgson, Jackson 
emphasizes the limits of the European Court of Human Rights’ capacity to 
define best practice through judicial decision-making. It struggles to 
compare widely enough across different jurisdictions, to look deeply 
enough into the variable practices discovered and to pay close enough 
attention to the local context. Like Hodgson, Jackson argues for the 
potential of comparative empirical research to provide better insights: in 
this case, the challenge is to define procedures that best balance the 
needs of state security against suspects’ rights of participation. Drawing 
on his own interview-based study of practice in Canada, the United States 
and the UK as well as previous comparative research by Cole and Vladek, 
he too suggests that what is needed is ‘interpretivist’ research that 
engages with the professional cultures and procedural traditions that 
underpin domestic and transnational practice.  
